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PRIVACY AND CONTROL 
Scott A. Davison 
In this paper, I explore several privacy issues as they arise with respect to 
the divine/human relationship. First, in section 1, I discuss the notion of 
privacy in a general way. Section 2 is devoted to the claim that privacy 
involves control over information about oneself. In section 3, I summarize 
the arguments offered recently by Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael 
McLain for the conclusion that God respects the privacy of human persons 
by refraining from knowing certain things about them. Finally, in section 4, 
I shall criticize Falls-Corbitt and McLain's arguments and make some con-
cluding remarks about God and privacy. 
The concept of privacy has been receiving increasing attention in the 
past few decades (see the articles collected together in Schoeman 1984, 
for example). Naturally enough, these recent discussions typically con-
cern privacy issues as they arise among human beings; very few people 
discuss privacy with respect to God. But in this paper, I shall explore 
several privacy issues as they arise with respect to the divine/human 
relationship. First, in section 1, I shall discuss the notion of privacy in a 
general way in order to get clear about the contours of the concept. 
Section 2 will be devoted to the claim that privacy involves control over 
information about oneself. In section 3, I shall summarize the argu-
ments offered recently by Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain 
for the conclusion that God respects the privacy of human persons by 
refraining from knowing certain things about them. Finally, in section 4, 
I shall criticize Falls-Corbitt and McLain's arguments and make some 
concluding remarks about God and privacy. 
1. Privacy. 
In English, there are several different uses of the word 'private' and 
its cognates, uses which suggest that speakers of English possess several 
different concepts of privacy. In this paper, I shall focus on just one con-
cept of privacy, albeit a central one (in my view). The use of this concept 
is most clearly illustrated in English when the word 'private' occurs as 
an adjective and modifies nouns signifying information of some kind. 
For example, consider sentences like these: "That file is private"; "I can't 
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answer your question about him because the answer is private"; and 
"Don't ask me questions about my private affairs." What does it mean 
to assert that a b:t of information is private? 
I have no analysis of the concept of privacy to offer here in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. But perhaps some general com-
ments and an informative necessary condition will suffice for my pur-
poses in this paper. First of all, the concept of privacy is person-relative, 
and doubly so. In other words, the locution "This information is pri-
vate" is incomplete as it stands. For example, one person's annual 
income may be private while another's may be a matter of public record. 
This example shows that the same kind of information may be private 
for one person but not for another. In addition, the same bit of informa-
tion about a single person may be private with respect to some people, 
but not private with respect to others. For instance, although my annual 
income may be private with respect to you, it is probably not private 
with respect to my employer. This double person-relativity of privacy 
makes careful descriptions of privacy a bit complex; when made explicit, 
they should take the following form: "This information about person S 
is private with respect to person P." 
What else can be said about this concept of privacy? It seems natural 
to suggest the following principle: 
(P) If a bit of information concerning a person P is private with 
respect to another person, then this other person has an obliga-
tion not to come to know about that bit of information concern-
ing P without P's consent. 
Unfortunately, this statement needs to be clarified and modified in sev-
eral ways before it can be accepted. One clarification concerns the fact 
that the obligation here is only prima facie: although information about 
which prescription drugs you take may be private with respect to me, it 
is permissible for me to read your medical bracelet wi thout your consent 
if I am a doctor trying to save your life in an emergency and you are 
unconscious. 
Furthermore, to be even more precise, if a bit of information about you 
is private with respect to me, then not only do I have a prima facie obliga-
tion not to come to know that bit of information without your consent; I 
am also obligated not to come to believe justifiably that bit of information 
without your consent. (Although justified true belief may fall short of 
knowledge, it can certainly violate privacy in the right circumstances.) 
Another modification to (P) concerns exactly what persons are oblig-
ated not to do: people are not really obligated not to come to believe jus-
tifiably private information concerning other persons without their con-
sent. For example, if someone accidentally places a letter from your con-
fidential personnel files on my desk (without your consent), I am not 
obligated not to come to believe justifiably the contents of the letter. 
Here it seems more accurate to say that your privacy has been compro-
mised than to say that your privacy has been violated, in the same way 
that a person's right not to be harmed would not be violated by the com-
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pletely accidental falling of a tree on his head (for a similar argument, 
see Schoeman 1984, p.4). Instead, if a bit of information about you is pri-
vate with respect to me, then I have a prima facie obligation not to come 
to believe it justifiably in a deliberate fashion without your consent. 
Another argument for this same modification of (P) stems from the 
claim that 'ought' implies 'can': if I come to believe justifiably something 
about you (without your consent) which is apparently private with 
respect to me and this happens in such a way that I could not have avoid-
ed doing so, then (by modus tollens) I cannot have an obligation not to 
come to believe this justifiably, which (by (P) and modlls tollens again) 
implies the absurd conclusion that this bit of information is not private 
with respect to me after all. Qualifying (P) by claiming that persons are 
obligated not to come to believe justifiably private information about oth-
ers without their consent in a deliberate fashion solves this problem because 
my obligation not to come to believe something justifiably in a deliberate 
fashion is still intact even if I come to know that same thing accidentally. 
(A different kind of problem, which is suggested by these reflections, 
is not solved by this modification to (P). Suppose that I am compelled to 
come to believe justifiably something in a deliberate fashion: for exam-
ple, imagine that someone threatens the life of my immediate family if I 
do not violate someone else's privacy. Then it seems at least plausible 
that I cannot be obligated not to come to believe justifiably something 
private about another person without that person's consent, in a deliber-
ate fashion, and once again (by the double application of modus tollens, 
as before) it follows that the apparently private information is no longer 
private with respect to me. Since the resolution of this objection would 
take me too far afield, into questions about conflicting obligations, I shall 
simply set it aside here.) 
Adding up all of these objections and clarifications, we arrive at the 
following principle, which is at least much closer to the truth than the 
original principle (P): 
CP*) If a bit of information concerning a person P is private with 
respect to another person, then this other person has a prima facie 
obligation not to come to believe justifiably that bit of informa-
tion concerning P in a deliberate fashion, without P's consent. 
There are surely other criticisms which could be raised against (P*), but I 
shall not consider any of them here, since CP*) is sufficiently informative 
to locate the concept of privacy which interests me in this paper. Also, I 
am aware of the fact that by itself, (P*) does not tell us what makes cer-
tain kinds of information distinctively private; it does not identify the 
essence of private information. (The converse of (P*) is false, by the way, 
since a person could be obligated because of a promise not to come to 
believe justifiably some non-private bit of information about another 
person.) In fact, because of significant differences among individuals 
and cultures concerning what counts as private information, I am not 
optimistic about the prospects for locating a completely general charac-
terization here. So instead I must rely here upon our intuitive under-
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standing of the notion of private information, which should be sufficient 
for my purposes. 
Finally, before attempting to assess the plausibility of connecting the 
notion of privacy with the notion of control over information about one-
self, it will be helpful to offer a definition of the notion of violating a per-
son's privacy which is approximately correct. (In this definition, the 
notion of private information is to be understood along the lines spelled 
out above.) 
(V) A person P's privacy has been violated if and only if either (a) 
someone comes to believe justifiably some private bit of infor-
mation concerning P in a deliberate fashion, without P's con-
sent, or (b) someone brings it about deliberately that another 
person comes to believe justifiably some private bit of informa-
tion concerning P without P's consent. 
2. Privacy and Control. 
For several reasons, it seems natural to connect the notion of privacy 
with the notion of having control over certain kinds of information 
about oneself. (Several authors make this connection explicitly: for 
example, see Fried 1968, p.209-210, Rachels 1975, p.292, and Falls-Corbitt 
and McLain 1992, p.370.) In this section, I will mention just two kinds of 
argument which could be offered in support of this connection before 
arguing against it. 
First, if I freely tell you something private about myself, in circum-
stances in which I could have refrained from doing so, then my privacy 
is intact; it is not violated. In this respect, the right to privacy resembles 
the right to private property: if I freely give you an object which I own, 
in circumstances in which I could have refrained from doing so, then 
you will own that object and my right to private property will not have 
been violated. By contrast, if I am forced by another person to reveal 
information about myself (or to forfeit an object which I own), then my 
right to privacy (or my right to private property) has been violated. This 
comparison suggests that a person's privacy is violated if others come to 
possess private information about her by means of a process over which 
she had no control. 
Here is another kind of argument which suggests that there is a con-
nection between the notion of privacy and the notion of having control 
over information about oneself. Let's say that a being is essentially infor-
mationally opaque just in case it is not possible for knowing agents to 
come to possess any information about it, whereas a being is essentially 
informationally transparent just in case it is not possible for knowing 
agents not to know everything about it. (It may turn out that these 
notions are not even possibly exemplified, but it should be clear that the 
point of this argument does not depend upon the resolution of that 
question.) Clearly enough, there would be no point in ascribing a right 
to privacy to beings which were either essentially informationally 
opaque or essentially informationally transparent; the question would 
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never even arise. Why are we different from such beings? What makes 
it appropriate to ascribe a right to privacy to us? Perhaps the most obvi-
ous way to draw a distinction here would be to point out that whether 
or not other knowing agents come to possess information about us is a 
contingent matter, whereas whether or not knowing agents come to pos-
sess information about these strange beings is a necessary matter. But 
clearly enough, not just any contingent mechanism for revealing infor-
mation about myself to other knowing agents will suffice to safeguard 
my privacy; instead, it seems that I must have control over such infor-
mation in order for my privacy to remain intact. 
These kinds of arguments (and others like them, which I cannot dis-
cuss here: see Fried 1968 and Rachels 1975, for example) make it natural 
to suppose that a person's privacy is intact to the extent that she has con-
trol over information about herself. In order to assess this proposal, it is 
important first to distinguish several different kinds of control. 
First, let's say that a person has imparting control over information 
about herself just in case she can bring it about that others possess such 
information. By contrast, let's say that a person has preventive control 
over information about herself just in case she can prevent others from 
coming to possess such information. Finally, let's say that a person has 
total control over information about herself just in case she has both 
imparting control and preventive control over information about herself. 
(It would be possible to distinguish other kinds of control, of course, and 
to attempt to explicate the notion captured by the tricky word 'can' as it 
occurs in these stipulative definitions, but since my argument does not 
require that we do those things, it will be wise not to do them here.) 
Consider the following principle, which concerns privacy and impart-
ing control: 
(PIC) A person's privacy is not violated only if she has impart-
ing control over information about herself. 
This principle is clearly false. If I am unable to move for some reason, 
then I may be unable to impart information about myself to others, but 
this by itself does not violate my privacy. 
Consider instead the following principle, which concerns privacy and 
preventive control: 
(PPC) A person's privacy is not violated only if she has preven-
tive control over information about herself. 
This principle is more plausible than (PIC), but it is also false. Suppose 
that I leave a briefcase at your house by accident, and you ask me over the 
phone what the briefcase contains, and I answer your question freely, 
thereby imparting information about myself to you in circumstances in 
which I could have refrained from doing so. Imagine also that unbe-
knownst to me, although you did not actually look in the briefcase your-
self (in the "actual sequence" of things), still, had I refrained from answer-
ing your personal question (in an "alternate sequence"), then you would 
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have opened the briefcase yourself in order to see what was inside. In this 
situation, my privacy is not violated, even though I lack preventive con-
trol over this information about myself. (This kind of example was made 
popular by Harry G. Frankfurt in another context, and the helpful terms 
"actual sequence" and "alternate sequence" occur in John Martin Fischer's 
insightful discussion of Frankfurt: see Frankfurt 1969 and Fischer 1982.) 
(Of course, since both (PIC) and (PPC) are false, it is obvious (by 
modus tollens) that the following principle is also false: 
(PTC) A person's privacy is intact only if she has total control 
over information about herself; 
hence I won't bother to discuss this principle here.) 
By way of conclusion, then, if there is a connection between privacy and 
controt it is not clear what that connection is. It seems much more promis-
ing to suggest that the violation of privacy essentially involves a lack of 
consent, rather than a lack of controt over information about oneself. 
At this point, I would like to focus upon privacy issues as they arise 
in the context of the divine/human relationship; as we shall see, ques-
tions about the essence of privacy and control over information about 
oneself loom large in this context. 
3. Falls-Corbitt and McLain. 
In a recent paper (Falls-Corbitt and McLain 1992), Margaret Falls-Corbitt 
and F. Michael McLain defend the striking conclusion that God respects the 
privacy of human persons by refraining from knowing certain things about 
them. They begin with an argument about the connection between autono-
my and privacy with respect to relationships among human beings, and 
then extend their analysis to the case of the divine/human relationship. In 
making this move, they claim to be making two assumptions, assumptions 
which I shall not challenge: (1) God grants libertarian freedom to human 
persons so that they may develop good character and relationships (with 
other human persons and with God); (2) reflection upon human moral 
obligation can illuminate divine action (either because God is bound by the 
same moral principles as we are, or because those principles which bind us 
reflect God's free choice of what constitutes moral value: see pp.369-370). 
(For an example of someone who believes that God would not violate the 
privacy of human persons by knowing all about them because God has no 
obligations towards them, see Schoeman 1984, p.xx.) 
Falls-Corbitt and McLain's argument about the connection between 
privacy and autonomy begins with some explanatory remarks concern-
ing privacy. After rejecting an analysis of privacy according to which 
privacy is the mere lack of information which others have about a per-
son, Falls-Corbitt and McLain claim that 
In its important moral sense "privacy" refers to our ability to 
control others' access to information about us, to the intimacies 
of our lives, to our thoughts, and to our bodies (p.370). 
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As we saw above, it is not clear how control and privacy are related. But 
after making this claim, Falls-Corbitt and McLain suggest that since 
complete control over information about oneself is impossible, what is 
really important is that 
... individuals retain control over when, where and to whom 
they make explicit self-revelations and over the conditions 
under which they put themselves in a position which risks inad-
vertently providing information (p.370). 
This sounds more plausible as an account of what matters with respect 
to privacy, but it is surely insufficient. For example, if I break into your 
home and read your diary, then your privacy is clearly violated, even 
though you may still have control over whether or not you make explicit 
self-revelations (or whether or not you put yourself in a position to 
reveal information inadvertently). 
At any rate, Falls-Corbitt and McLain's argument concerning the con-
nection between privacy and autonomy warrants close scrutiny. First of 
all, they claim that we have a fundamental duty to respect the autonomy 
of persons, which involves allowing a person's "choices, especially her 
well-informed decisions, to be centrally determinative of what happens 
to her" (pp.370-371). (Although a complete analysis of autonomy along 
these lines surely must include some normative component concerning 
the kinds of choices in view here, I shall ignore this difficulty in what 
follows.) By itself, this duty implies that if a person desires that we 
should not come to know something about her, then we are prima facie 
obligated not to do so; in other words, respecting autonomy involves 
respecting privacy. 
Falls-Corbitt and McLain then claim that " . .. this analysis of the 
moral value of privacy makes an initially strong case for the position 
that God shows prima facie regard for our privacy by allowing us to 
choose whether and when to make self-disclosure before God" (p.371). 
The rest of their paper is devoted to the examination and critique of 
three lines of objection to their central argument; in the next section, I 
shall discuss only their responses to the second line of objection, since 
the most interesting philosophical issues concerning privacy arise here. 
Before doing that, though, it seems important to point out an obvious 
objection to their position which they simply do not consider. Although 
it makes sense to claim that God could choose not to exercise certain 
powers (for instance, the power of determining the choices of human per-
sons), it is very hard to make sense of the claim that God could choose to 
limit God's knowledge. We understand how it is possible for human per-
sons to limit their knowledge, but this is only because human persons 
typically come to know things by means of processes over which they 
have some measure of control. Sometimes we can avoid coming to pos-
sess perceptual knowledge of a given state of affairs, for instance, simply 
by not being in the right place at the right time. But does this kind of 
explanation make any sense when applied to God? 
Here people are bound to disagree, of course, but traditional theists 
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seem committed to the claim that God is omniscient with respect to 
human persons for very straightforward metaphysical reasons. (Here I 
shall rely upon our intuitive understanding of the doctrine of omni-
science; I shall not discuss the problem of future contingents, for 
instance, since nothing of substance here turns on our resolution of that 
question. Nor will I discuss the question of God's ownership or partner-
ship in the free actions of created persons, since those cases are especial-
ly complex and privacy issues do not arise only in those contexts.) 
Traditionally, theists have held that God's creative activity with respect 
to the world includes the following contributions: (1) Creation, which 
refers to the original process whereby the world comes to be ex nihilo; 
(2) Conservation, which refers to God's sustaining the created world in 
being from moment to moment; (3) Concurrence, which refers to God's 
cooperation with the activity of secondary causes (including human per-
sons as they act freely). A commonplace way of expressing the necessity 
of God's conservation is illustrated by the familiar claim that if God 
were to cease sustaining the world, then it would fall into nothingness. 
(This claim is echoed in many formulations of the so-called cosmological 
argument for God's existence.) If this traditional view of God's relation-
ship to the created order is even approximately correct, then it seems 
extremely difficult to see how God could not know everything about 
every human person. After all, God is "present" in every place in which 
God acts, and God acts everywhere, at every time. 
(Thomists have even stronger reasons for endorsing this conclusion, 
of course, since they hold that God's knowledge of the world is based 
upon God's knowledge of God's own essence (more specifically, it is 
based on God's knowledge of the divine ideas, which serve as perfect 
prototypes for God's creation). But one need not be a Thomist in order 
to be a traditional theist, so I shall not discuss the Thomistic view any 
further.) 
If this argument shows that it is necessary that God knows the private 
details of all human persons (and I think that it does), then it is not even 
possible for God to respect the privacy of human persons in the way 
envisaged by Falls-Corbitt and McLain. Furthermore, since 'ought' 
implies 'can' (and 'logically impossible' implies 'cannot'), it follows that 
it is not the case that God is prima facie obliged to respect the privacy of 
human persons (so that something must be wrong with Falls-Corbitt 
and McLain's argument to the contrary). 
What should traditional theists say about the connection between 
autonomy and privacy? Since God cannot respect our privacy in the 
way envisioned by Falls-Corbitt and McLain, should we conclude that 
God cannot respect our autonomy, either? No. First of all, there are 
other ways of respecting privacy, to be sure; for instance, God does not 
directly reveal the intimate details of our lives to other human persons, 
thank goodness. Second, there are other ways to respect autonomy 
besides respecting privacy, as illustrated by Falls-Corbitt and McLain's 
claim that God grants libertarian free choice to human persons and typi-
cally respects their choices by not interfering with them. (I shall say 
more about these things in the next section.) 
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By way of summary, then, I believe that the argument from God's cre-
ative contribution by itself is sufficient to defuse Falls-Corbitt and 
McLain's main argument for the conclusion that God respects the priva-
cy of human persons by refraining from knowing about their private 
lives (at least for traditional theists). But their arguments concerning the 
relationship between privacy and character, trust, and intimacy are still 
worth considering in some detail, since they are very revealing and 
informative. 
4. The Instrumental Value of Privacy. 
Falls-Corbitt and McLain's arguments concerning the instrumental 
value of privacy occur in response to the second line of objection to their 
position which they consider. This second line of objection to their posi-
tion concerns God's authority; roughly, the claim is that God's special 
authority over us and God's moral perfection override God's prima facie 
duty to respect our privacy (p.373). In response to this worry, Falls-
Corbitt and McLain argue that God's purposes behind giving human 
creatures libertarian free choice (namely, the development of good char-
acter and intimate relationships) require that God respect the privacy of 
human persons. In order to make out this case, they defend the necessi-
ty of privacy for intimacy, trust, independent moral thinking, and 
morally accountable selfhood, and then they argue that similar consider-
ations apply to the divine/human relationship. (Here I shall focus pri-
marily on their comments concerning the divine/human relationship.) 
Falls-Corbitt and McLain argue that if God knows all of the private 
details of a human person's life, then the kind of intimacy between God 
and that person which is possible is very different from intimacy among 
humans, which involves voluntary self-disclosure. Here it will be help-
ful to quote them at some length: 
We argued that fundamental components of the experience of 
human intimacy require privacy because it allows a voluntary, 
self-determined giving of one's historical, psychological and 
philosophical story. It follows from this that if confessing before 
God what God already knows is all that is possible, then intima-
cy with God of a sort comparable to what we know through human 
interaction is not possible .... As long as our relationship to God 
lacks truly free and self-determining self-disclosure, then the 
sense in which that relationship is "intimate" has only a rather 
distant analogy to what the term means when we apply it to our 
experience with one another (p.378, italics theirs). 
In response to this argument, several points should be made. First of all, 
just because privacy "allows" for voluntary self-disclosure, it clearly does 
not follow that privacy is necessary for voluntary self-disclosure (and 
hence for intimacy), and this is so whether "privacy" is used to denote 
control over information about oneself or the lack of God's knowledge 
about oneself (Falls-Corbitt and McLain seem to have both notions in 
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mind here: see pp.377-378). Privacy (in this odd sense) may be part of 
some situations of voluntary self-disclosure, but it need not be part of 
every situation of voluntary self-disclosure. 
To see that this is so, consider first the claim that I can engage in vol-
untary self-disclosure only if I have control over information about 
myself. As the example discussed in section 2 shows, this is clearly 
false: I may voluntarily disclose something about myself even though 
that same information would have been disclosed by someone else had I 
not disclosed it myself. Hence voluntary self-disclosure does not require 
control over information about oneself (in the sense that one can prevent 
others from coming to know things about oneself). 
The other claim which Falls-Corbitt and McLain seem to have in mind 
here is that voluntary self-disclosure of information about myself to 
another person is impossible if the other person already knows the infor-
mation in question. Is this true? No. In fact, I can engage in voluntary 
self-disclosure to you even if I knozl} that you already know what I will 
say before I say it. This happens very often in parent-child relationships, 
for instance: parents discover bad things which their children have 
done, and then question the children in order to give them the opportu-
nity to engage in voluntary self-disclosure (instead of persisting in 
deceit). This often takes place even when the children know that their 
parents have discovered what they did. (Something like this is also sug-
gested by the conversations between God and Adam and Eve after the 
Fall (and also between God and Cain after the murder of AbeD in 
Genesis.) Similar situations can occur with adults who are peers; in those 
cases, we typically describe voluntary self-disclosure by means of verbs 
like 'admit', 'confess', and 'come out into the open'. 
Now some might dispute my description of these cases in terms of 
the concept of disclosure, arguing that true disclosure requires the 
imparting of information which is not already known. If this is right, 
then although the cases which I have mentioned above might involve 
other kinds of important interpersonal exchange, they should not be 
viewed as involving disclosure per se. (Here I should convey my thanks 
to an anonymous referee for disclosing this point to me.) In response to 
this worry, it seems appropriate to shift the focus onto the importance of 
disclosure per se: given that the kinds of intimate exchange which I have 
described do not require disclosure per se, why should we think that it is 
necessary for intimate relationships, whether human or divine? Again, 
it seems that the burden of proof falls to Falls-Corbitt and McLain to 
argue that this is the case. (Thanks again to the anonymous referee men-
tioned above, this time for disclosing this response to the objection pre-
viously disclosed.) 
Hence I conclude that Falls-Corbitt and McLain are mistaken in think-
ing that my voluntary self-disclosure of some fact to you requires either 
my control over information about myself or ignorance on your part 
concerning the disclosed fact, and they have not shown that intimacy 
with God must be vastly different from the intimacy shared among 
human beings. 
(Of course, if Falls-Corbitt and McLain were to insist upon the neces-
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sity for intimacy of conveying private information to God which God 
has never known, then they could argue that voluntary self-disclosure 
would be impossible with an omniscient God, but such an insistence 
seems entirely without foundation, even in the human sphere.) 
Even though this criticism of Falls-Corbitt and McLain seems correct, 
some may have lingering doubts about the value of voluntary self-dis-
closure before an omniscient God. Is there anything more informative 
which could be said about this? In a very interesting essay, C. S. Lewis 
offers the following remarks in response to a similar query: 
We are always completely, and therefore equally, known to 
God. . .. But though this knowledge never varies, the quality of 
our being known can .... Ordinarily, to be known by God is to 
be, for this purpose, in the category of things. We are like earth-
worms, cabbages, and nebulae, objects of divine knowledge. 
But when we (a) become aware of the fact - the present fact, 
not the generalisation - and (b) assent with all our might to be 
so known, then we treat ourselves, in relation to God, not as 
things but as persons. We have unveiled (Lewis 1963, p.2l). 
Lewis here presents a very attractive picture of the value of voluntary 
self-disclosure before an omniscient God: we have control not over 
whether or not God knows things about us, but rather over the way in 
which we are known by God. (If I had more time and space, I would 
attempt to develop this suggestion further and explore the connections 
between this account and accounts of freedom which are compatible 
with inevitability, connections which Lewis himself also noticed.) I con-
clude that the notion of voluntary self-disclosure before an omniscient 
God is tolerably clear, and hence that Falls-Corbitt and McLain have not 
shown that intimacy between God and human persons (of the sort 
which is found among human persons) is impossible. 
Falls-Corbitt and McLain also argue that intimacy involves trust and 
trust requires privacy for its development. As before, it will be helpful 
to quote from them at some length: 
If we act towards God as the moral author and judge who 
"sees" and "hears" all things, then it would seem impossible for 
us to learn either that God trusts us or that we are worthy of 
God's trust. To become worthy of trust I must be able to recog-
nize my situation as one in which T have been trusted. If we 
think God observes our every thought, then we do not know 
that God has ever trusted us or that we have ever met the test of 
God's trust (p.378). 
Is it true that in order to become trustworthy, I must be in situations in 
which the person trusting me does not know whether or not I will act in 
a trustworthy manner? I don't think so. Becoming trustworthy and 
knowing that one is trustworthy require situations of trust, all right, but 
situations of trust need not involve ignorance of the outcome on the part 
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of the person trusting. Instead, a real situation of trust probably 
involves something like a lack of control over the outcome on the part of 
the one trusting. For example, I can trust my five year old nephew not 
to eat the candy on the table while I'm gone even if I know that he will 
eat it in my absence. When I return and find the candy gone, I would be 
speaking truly to him if I said the following: "I trusted you, but you let 
me down." This kind of feedback is essential for learning how to be 
trustworthy people. Similar considerations show that it is possible for 
me to trust another person when I know that the person will act in a 
trustworthy manner. As critics of arguments for the incompatibility of 
divine foreknowledge and human freedom often point out, merely 
knowing in advance what someone will choose to do does not by itself 
imply that the person is not acting freely or is controlled by something 
external. 
So although situations of trust may require a lack of control over the 
outcome on the part of the one trusting, they need not involve ignorance 
of the outcome on the part of the person trusting. But this lack of control 
over the outcome of a situation is exactly what God has granted human 
persons, according to Falls-Corbitt and McLain's first assumption about 
libertarian free choice. Hence I conclude that they are simply mistaken 
about the relationship between privacy and trust with respect to the 
divine/human relationship. 
A third area which Falls-Corbitt and McLain address in this vein is 
the area of independent moral thought: 
We need human respect for our privacy in order to value and 
encourage within ourselves autonomous moral reflection. Is 
this true in our relationship with God as well? A strong reason 
for answering in the affirmative is that independent moral 
thought that leaves no stone unturned must conceive the possi-
bility that even the most repugnant ideas are true. This suggests 
that what is finally unthinkable before God must be open to 
exploration, and consideration of the unthinkable is bound to 
come more easily under a conception of God as listening only 
when asked (p.379). 
In response to this argument, several obvious points should be made. 
First of all, there is no argument given for the assumption that the kind of 
independent moral thought required for trust must "leave no stone 
unturned". Second, even if it did require this, "consideration of the 
unthinkable" is clearly possible in the presence of an omniscient God. (In 
fact, there seem to have been actual cases of adoption of the "unthinkable" 
by persons who took themselves to be in the presence of an omniscient 
God.) The fact that such consideration would "come more easily" under 
a different conception of God seems quite irrelevant, unless Falls-Corbitt 
and McLain can show that it would be extremely difficult under the con-
ception of God as omniscient. Hence it seems safe to conclude that Falls-
Corbitt and McLain have not shown that an awareness of an omniscient 
God would preclude the development of independent moral thought. 
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Finally, Falls-Corbitt and McLain also argue that privacy with respect 
to God is needed in order for a person to become a morally accountable 
self. They claim that if we knew that God knew everything about us, 
then this would be 
... to live in full and unbroken acknowledgement that our pri-
vate mullings may be unwanted performances and, therefore, 
that the content of our consciousness is not uniquely ours. By 
right of access, it belongs as well to an Other. As a result, the 
sense of unique responsibility for one's thoughts which one 
might otherwise develop is severely attenuated; the opportunity 
to take possession of oneself, so to speak, is nullified. It is very 
doubtful that out of such a weakened sense of responsibility or 
self-possession there could come an agent who accepts full 
responsibility for her beliefs and actions and recognizes fellow 
humans as likewise accountable (p.380). 
What should we say about this argument? I am not convinced. For one 
thing, is it true that knowing about awareness of my thoughts would 
attenuate my sense of unique responsibility for them? Once again, the 
opposite seems to me to be true: knowing that God is aware of my 
thoughts is likely to make me feel more responsible for those thoughts, 
not less, in the same way in which I feel more responsible for my actions 
among human persons if they know about those actions. (Indeed, if 
there is a danger here, I'm inclined to think that it lies in the other direc-
tion, namely, that a sense of God's awareness of our thoughts can make 
us feel overly burdenened by personal responsibility for those thoughts.) 
And, of course, such a sense of responsibility for my own thoughts is 
bound to contribute to a sense that others are responsible for their own 
thoughts and actions. 
In addition, a sense of responsibility for my thoughts implies owner-
ship of them: I am responsible for them because they are my thoughts. 
(If I felt that they were someone else's thoughts, then I wouldn't feel 
responsible for them: I would be "off the hook", so to speak.) My 
thoughts do not become someone else's thoughts just because someone 
else knows about them. In fact, I may even develop a stronger sense of 
self than otherwise because of my belief that God is aware of my 
thoughts; other people who lack this belief, by contrast, may not reflect 
much upon their thoughts or feel responsible for them, and hence they 
may not regard their thoughts as parts of themselves in the way in 
which I do. In any case, Falls-Corbitt and McLain certainly have not 
shown that privacy with respect to God is necessary for the formation of 
a morally accountable self. 
A final argument should be mentioned here. The person-relativity of 
privacy (mentioned in section 1) makes Falls-Corbitt and McLain's pro-
posal seem quite strained when we try to think about it in any detail. 
For if Falls-Corbitt and McLain were correct, then it would be quite pos-
sible for the same type of information about two different human per-
sons to be private with respect to God for one of them and not private 
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with respect to God for the other. Furthermore, whether or not a given 
fact about a given person is private with respect to God could itself be 
something which is private with respect to God. After all, what people 
regard as private about themselves is a very revealing thing; this is one 
reason why people respond to personal queries by saying "It's a long 
story" instead of "That's a private matter". But how is God supposed to 
know which things God can know without violating the privacy of 
human persons? And when is God permitted to "watch" what people 
do (since not every moment spent alone is spent doing private things)? 
These puzzles suggest that Falls-Corbitt and McLain's proposal might 
be impossible even for God to carry out. 
How strong is this argument against their proposal? Well, perhaps 
there is a way to explain how all of this is possible, but I don't see what 
it is. It seems safe to conclude that Falls-Corbitt and McLain owe us 
some kind of explanation concerning these things before their proposal 
can be considered a live option. 
By way of conclusion, then, Falls-Corbitt and McLain have not shown 
that privacy with respect to God is instrumentally necessary for intimacy, 
trust, independent moral thinking, or morally accountable selfhood. 
Much more could be said about these things, of course, but I shall not say 
any of it here. Since the argument from the traditional theistic conception 
of God's activity in the world (developed in section 3) provides tradition-
al theists with a good reason for believing that God is omniscient, I con-
clude that Falls-Corbitt and McLain are mistaken in holding that God has 
a prima facie obligation to respect the privacy of human persons by 
refraining from knowing all about them. Finally, they are also mistaken 
in thinking that there is a clear connection between privacy and control 
over information about oneself, as the argument of section 2 shows.* 
Morehead State University 
(*1 wish to thank the following persons for helpful comments concerning 
earlier versions of this paper: Wendell O'Brien, Thomas P. Flint, George 
Mavrodes and the other participants in the 1996 Meeting of the Society for 
Philosophy of Religion in Atlanta, William Wainwright, and an anonymous 
referee for this Journal.) 
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